XRTN ransomware

A VaultCrypt-family strain from December 2015, XRTN is assembled from batch scripts and a bundled copy of GnuPG rather than a single compiled binary. A JavaScript attachment dressed as a Word file pulls down GnuPG, a decoy document and the script, which builds an RSA-1024 key pair, encrypts matching files on every drive and adds .xrtn. The victim's private key goes into XRTN.key, itself locked with a master key held by the operators. A randomly named HTA page gives xrtnhelp[@]yandex.ru as the only contact and quotes no price; where UAC is on, Windows asks permission to delete shadow copies, and refusing keeps them. Trun and Xort later reused the same text with other mailboxes.

Sources: In-house research

File extensions: .xrtn

Decryptor: No public decryptor was found.

Data exfiltration risk: Undocumented — The HTA message only asks the victim to email the operators and says nothing about copied files. No leak site is tied to XRTN.

Systems typically targeted: Windows PCs reached by email; the script walks every drive letter for documents, images, databases and archives.

Do this first: The key file holds the victim's private key wrapped by the operators' master key, so deleting it removes any later chance of recovery. Decline any UAC prompt that appears after encryption, since it is the request to wipe shadow copies.

Dealing with an active incident? Our incident response team is available 24/7.

Emergency response: +1 (877) 364-5161

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